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In the Supreme Court 
Of the State of Utah 
GENERAL MILLS, INC., a corpora-
tion of the State of Delaware, doing 
business under the trade name of 
SPERRY FLOUR COMPANY, 
Western Division of General Mills, 
Inc., and ZURICH GENERAL 





INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 




DEFEl\TDAJ.~T OLGA LASSEN HANSEN'S BRIEF 
ADDITIONAL STATE~IENT OF FACTS 
In the proceedings or hearing held at Ogden, Utah, 
June 5, 1939, Commissioner Knerr stated, on pages 2, 
3 and 4 of the record, what the record showed and 
then asked of the representative of the Sperry Flour 
Company, Neil R. Olmstead, the following question: 
"Are you willing to admit that on March 17, 1938, 
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2 
Mari us Hansen was injured by reason of an accident 
arising out of or in course of his employment by the 
Sperry Flour Company 1'' 
Mr. Olmstead: "Just a moment. I have an objec-
tion that I would like to state for the record.'' When 
granted permission, Mr. Olmstead said: "On behalf 
of the Sperry Flour Company and the Zurich General 
Accident and Liability Company its insurance carrier, 
I object to any proceedings on this application filed 
for the reason that it includes therein a claim for 
disability and compensation for the period from June 
1, 1938, to April 18, 1939, and that this applicant, or 
these applicants, are not entitled to apply for or receive 
compensation for the period of disability that existed 
prior to Mr. Hansen's death. 
"I make that objection to the application as a whole, 
and I have a further objection to make, and I make 
an objection as follows: 
''On behalf of the Sperry Flour Company and 
the Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance 
Company, Ltd., I object to that portion of the applica-
tion wherein claim is made for disability compensation 
for the period from June 1 to April 18, 1939, for the 
reason that the applicants are not entitled to apply 
for or receive compensation for the period of disability 
that existed prior to Mr. Hansen's death." 
Com. Knerr : "Your objection as to that is over-
ruled. I take it you are familiar with the Supreme 
Court decision on that in the Park case.'' 
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Are you willing to admit that on March 17, 1938, 
the deceased herein was injured by reason of an acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of his employment 
while employed by the Sperry Flour Company T'' 
Mr. Olmstead: "We will so admit." 
Com. Knerr: ''Are you willing to stipulate that 
as a result of said injury he died on April 18, 1939 T'' 
Mr. Olmstead: "We will not so stipulate." 
Com. Knerr: ''Are you willing to stipulate that 
Marius Hansen on the date of his injury was paid a 
wage amounting to the sum of $240.00 per month work-
ing six days per week T'' 
Mr. Olmstead: "Yes." 
Com. Knerr: "Are you willing to stipulate that 
the (page 5) applicant is the widow of the deceased T 
And was living with him at the time of the injury 1 
And was dependent on him for her maintenance and 
support?'' 
Mr. Olmstead: "Yes." 
Com. Knerr: "And that a minor daughter, June 
Hansen, 18 years of age on May 2, 1939, was the daugh-
ter of the decedent and was living with him at the time 
of his accident and that she was dependent on him for 
her maintenance and support up to the time of his 
deathT" 
Mr. Olmstead: "We will stipulate as to that." 
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Com. Knerr: ''The only question at issue is as 
to whether or not Marius Hansen who was injured on 
March 17, 1938, by reason of an accident arising out 
of or in the course of his employment while employed 
by the Sperry Flour Company, and as to whether or not 
as a result of said injury he died on April 18, 1939; 
and also the question as to whether or not the appli-
cant would be entitled to be paid compensation on ac-
count of temporary total disability suffered by Marius 
Hansen on and after June 1, 1938, up to the date of his 
death April 18, 1939 ~ '' 
Mr. Olmstead: "The only claim with respect to 
the death benefit is the question as to whether or not 
death was the result of the accident that occurred on 
J\iarch 1, 1938 ~'' 
Com. Knerr : ''Correct.'' 
Mr. Olmstead: "And the question of whether or 
not this applicant is entitled to receive any benefits 
during the period of June 3, 1938, to the date of Mr. 
Hansen's death~'' 
Com. Knerr: "Yes. That is a matter of law." 
Mr. Olmstead: "Yes, or a matter of fact." 
The above is the entire record as to any stipulations 
mentioned then. 
On page 25 of the report of the hearing at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on July 26, 1939, appears the follow-
Ing: 
Mr. Olmstead: "I might state for the record that 
at the time of the first hearing the defendants of course 
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did not know what they would have at this time and 
at that time we were laboring under the impression 
that the injury occurred on March 17th in the course 
of Mr. Hansen's employment, and at that time it was 
stipulated between the parties that Mr. Hansen was 
injured on that date, in the course of his employment. 
But in view of what I know now it becomes necessary 
for me to withdraw from that stipulation and to advise 
the parties that we are making an issue on the question 
of whether or not Mr. Hansen was engaged in-Mr. 
· Hansen was in fact injured in the course of his employ-
ment. I state that into the record at this time so that 
the other parties may be able to meet the issue." 
Com. J ugler: ''We will continue the case until to-
morrow afternoon. with the definite understanding that 
it will be closed at that time, and if there is any other 
reason for a COJ!tinuance after that you will have to ask 
for a new hearing.'' 
Thereupon this matter was continued until the fol-
lowing afternoon at two o'clock. 
At Salt Lake City, July 27, 1939, for the first 
time an attorney appeared for the applicants and then 
the record shows that Dan B. Shields appeared for 
them. Esther Peterson was sworn as a witness for 
appellant, and on pages 27 to 30 of the record appears 
her testimony which in substance is that on a Sunday 
evening around ].farch 20, 1938, she was present when 
Mr. Hansen was in an automobile collision while he 
was operating his car, and only he and the witness were 
present; that Mr. Hansen's car was proceeding north 
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between seven and eight o'clock as they were entering 
Sigurd, and at a turn in the road just before one crosses 
the railroad track another car came in an opposite direc-
tion at a terrific rate of speed and hit the left front 
wheel and fender of the Hansen car and damaged them; 
that the other car speeded away and "it gave him a 
terrific jolt" and that she didn't know of any other 
injuries, that ''he complained of a terrible lump in his 
stomach right here. He complained to me about it 
and he hadn't complained to me about it previous" 
of a pain in his chest. He was able to operate the 
car and drove as far as Gunnison where he remained 
that night; that she rode with Mr. Hansen on either 
Thursday or Friday before this Sunday night from 
Centerfield to Richfield and he didn't complain of any 
disability at that time to her. 
ARGU1IENT 
On page 4 of plaintiff's brief they say: "It is not 
disputed that l\1:arius Hansen was an employee of the 
plaintiffs, that the General Mills, Inc. (Sperry Flour 
Company) was at all times herein concerned as an em-
ployer under the workmen's compensation law of the 
State of Utah, or that if Marins Hansen was injured 
in the course of employment he would be entitled to 
compensation, or that if he died as a result of injuries 
arising out of and in the course of his employment his 
dependents would be entitled to compensation. * * * 
That Marins Hansen sometime in March sustained 
serious injuries is not contested.'' 
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By turning to page 1 of the record, it will be found 
that R. L. Hickman, Office Manager of the Sperry 
Flour Company (page 20 of record made in Salt Lake 
City) under date of March 25, 1938, made n report, 
under the provisions of 42-1-90, Revised Statutes of 
Utah, 1933, in which he states that Marins Hansen, an 
employee of the Sperry }.,lour Mill Company, who was 
being paid $240.00 per month, was ''injured on :March 
17, 1938, at 10:30 A. M." while "Driving south of 
Payson, Utah, on highway No. 91 when rounding a 
curve in the road struck an icy place on the road, 
causing car to leave highway throwing :Mr. Hansen 
against the steering wheel and wind shield'' and the 
exact part of the person injured was ''Ruptured 
Stomach'' and that the machine with which the injury 
occurred was an ''auto'' and the part injuring him 
was ''Steering Wheel'' and on -2- is an Employer's 
Supplemental Report of Injury from the Sperry Flour 
Company giving Employee's name as Marins Hansen, 
Date of Injury 3-17-38 which purports to be signed by 
Geo. Hohl, chief accountant and dated 6-2-38. That in 
a letter from De Vine, Howell & Stine by Neil R. 
Olmstead to the Industrial Commission under date of 
March 23, 1939, the date of injury was stated as March 
17, 1938, and also in almost all other exhibits the same 
date appears. 
Under Statement of Errors (page 7 of plaintiff's 
brief) the only error assigned is "There is no evidence 
whatever in the record that ~Ir. Hansen was injured 
while in the course of his employment either on March 
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1'7, 1938, or March 20, 1938, near Payson, Utah, and 
that if he died as the result of injuries sustained in an 
accident it was the accident of ~{arch 20, 1938. '' 
To sustain this position, they argue that ''a stipula-
tion which is entered into by mistake or inadvertance 
may be withdrawn, and that it is within the sound discre-
tion of the Court to permit the withdrawal of such stipu-
·~ation provided the other party is not thereby placed at 
'a disadvantage,'' and ''that the Commission accepted the 
withdrawal of the stipulation by adjourning the case 
to permit the introduction of testimony which showed 
the stipulation to be untrue and permitted the introduc-
tion of such testimony and that neither the withdrawal 
of the stipulation nor the testimony was objected to by 
anyone and that such evidence is the only positive evi-
dence in the record of the time, place or circumstance 
.of an injury to Mr. Hansen." 
As noted above, counsel at the hearing in Ogden 
was asked if they were willing to admit that on March 
· 17, 1938, the deceased herein was injured by reason of an 
~ccident arising out of or in course of his employment 
while employed by the Sperry Flour Company, and he 
answered, ''We will so admit.'' 
That admission was never withdrawn, nor the ad-
missions made by ~{r. R. L. Hickman made under date 
of March 25, 1938, in the report above referred to. After 
that admission had been made, there were certain so-
called stipulations put into the record, and apparently 
. it was these that they requested to withdraw . 
. 1· 
In Civil Jury Trials by Austin Abbott, on page 413 
·it is said: 
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''A formal admission of a material fact made 
by counsel in course of the trial of the issues 
for the purpose of influencing the course of the 
trial is conclusive upon the client citing Frey vs. 
Myers, Tex. Civ. App., 113 S. W. 592." 
1 c. J. 1363: 
''In the law of evidence, a voluntary acknow-
ledgment by a party of the existence of the truth 
of certain facts, a concession or acknowledgment 
made by a party of the existence or truth of cer-
tain facts, a statement of a fact against the in-
terest of the party making it, an acknowledgment 
of the existence of a fact, of which it is evidence 
only in the sense that it dispenses with the proof 
of it." 
Geobrig vs. Stryker, 174 Fed. 897, 899; 22 C. J. 
330, § 370: 
"When a judicial admission is once made, it 
is, unless the Court permits it to be withdrawn as 
having been made by mistake or improvidently, 
binding on the parties, and counsel, and even on 
the Court itself, except as to matters of law.'' 
Waldron vs. Waldron, 156 U. S. 361, 39 L. Ed. 
453. 
Prestwood vs. Watson, 111 Ala. 604-608; 20 
So. 600. 
Holley vs. Young, 68 MC 215; 28 Am. Rep. 40. 
Connor vs. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co., 168 Mich. 
29; 133 N. W. 1003. 
In Holley vs. Young, supra, the Court says : 
"When admissions are made deliberately and 
intelligently, in the presence of the Court and 
reduced to writing, they are of the best species 
111n 
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of evidence, and the parties cannot be permitted 
to retract admission of fact, made in any form.'' 
In Connor vs. Lake Shore, etc. R. Co. supra, the 
Court said that where there was other proof establishing 
the fact admitted at a former trial, admissions cannot 
be withdrawn. 
As to the stipulations set forth above, they were to 
the effect that $240.00 per month was what Mr. Hansen 
was paid, and that the applicant was the widow of the 
deceased and was living with him at the time of the 
injury and was dependent on him for her maintenance 
and support and also as to the daughter, June Hansen. 
In Brink vs. Ind. Comm., 368 Ill. 607; 15 N. E. 2nd 
491, it is held that parties will not be relieved from a 
stipulation in absence of a clear showing that the matter 
stipulated is untrue, and then only when the application 
is to be relieved is reasonably made. 
Brown vs. Superior Court, Cal. 52 P. 2nd 
256, holds that granting of a motion to set aside 
stipulation rests in discretion of the trial court. 
Haney vs. Holt, 179 Ark. 403, 16 S. W. 463, 
says that failure to set aside a stipulation entered 
into between parties' attorneys and reciting de-
fendants indebtedness to plaintiffs held not an 
abuse of discretion. 
Foot vs. Adams, 248 N. Y. S. 539, 232 App. 
Div. 60, held that parties should not be lightly and 
unnecessarily relieved from a stipulation entered 
into by misapprehension. 
Wilder vs. Beach, 245 N.Y. S. 142, 137 Misc. 
883, holds that stipulations in open court, made 
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part of the record, could be set aside only for 
fraud, collusion or mistake, and a failure to 
comply therewith was not excused because not 
willful. 
Clark vs. Deleware and H. R. R. Corp., 283 
N.Y. S. 739, 245 App. Div. 447, holds that where 
party seeks to be relieved from stipulation relied 
upon by adversary, court should not exercise its 
discretion if relief would prejudice substantial 
rights. 
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. vs. Barlow, 20 N. 
Dak. 197, 126 N. W. 233, Ann. Cas. 1912 C, 763, 
says "While the appellate court will not interfere 
with nor control the exercise of the discretion thus 
vested in trial court, except in cases of clear 
abuse of such discretion, in this case the action 
of the court setting aside the stipulation of 
counsel as to the facts was an abuse of discretion 
which the appellate court must set aside.'' Citing 
Keen vs. Robertson, 46 Nebr. 837, 65 N. W. 897, 
which holds: "When their enforcement would 
result in serious injury to one of the parties and 
the other party would not be prejudiced by being 
set aside.'' 
Lewis vs. Sumner, 13 Met. (Mass.) 269. 
Lincoln vs. Lincoln St. R. Co., 67 Nebr. 469, 
93 N. W. 766 where it was_ held: "In sustaining 
the ruling of the trial court in refusing to relieve 
plaintiff therefrom the Court among other things 
said: 'It would also seem that the application 
came too late to be entertained by the Court. The 
plaintiff had made its case and rested. It put in 
evidence all of the stipulation except the portion 
of it which defendants were attempting to intro-
duce, and it would have been injust at that stage 
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of the proceedings to deny defendants the benefit 
of these paragraphs. Yet counsel insist that the 
Court, in the exercise of its discretion, ought to 
have sustained the objection and granted the 
request; the result would have been a mistrial. 
It would have rendered it necessary to retry the 
whole case, and to require this to be done would 
have been an abuse of discretion.' '' 
There has been a loose use of the word" stipulation" 
in this proceedings, to wit: Where Commissioner Knerr 
asks Mr. Olmstead if he will stipulate to certain matters. 
According to the usual use of that word, a stipulation 
is an agreement between counsel respecting business 
before a Court. It would be peculiar for one side to 
enter into a stipulation with the Court as to the facts. 
Here the only explanation would be that as the applicant 
did not have an attorney present, the Commissioner tried 
to simplify the hearing by getting certain matters 
settled and thereby, in a way, keep the hearing from being 
one sided. At any rate, the only matters labeled as 
stipulations are as set forth above, and they must be 
what the counsel referred to when he asked to withdraw 
his stipulations. They certainly did not withdraw their 
admissions. 
In their argument, plaintiffs claim as follows: ''In 
the case at bar the stipulation was withdrawn without 
objection from anyone. The commission accepted the 
withdrawal of the stipulation by adjourning· the case 
to permit the introduction of testimony which showed the 
stipulation to be untrue, and did permit the introduction 
of such testimony. This testimony was not objected to 
by anyone, and is the only positive evidence in the record 
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as to the time, place and circumstances of any injury to 
Mr. Hansen." 
We now refer to that testimony and how it was 
received. In the first place, it came when for the first 
time the aplicants had an attorney present and the record 
shows that that attorney could have had no knowledge 
as to what the record showed as to any admissions or 
stipulations and as the law says, 42-1-82, that "The 
Commission shall not be bound by the usual common law 
or statutory rules of evidence, or by any mechanical 
or formal rules of procedure, other than as herein pro-
vided, but may make its investigations in such manner 
as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the 
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out justly 
the spirit of this title." 
The Commission could have applied the wording 
of the statute set forth in 104-49-2, Sub. 3, Revised 
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and disregarded the whole of 
this evidence on which the plaintiffs herein rely and 
very justly have done so. The only other person who 
could have known of the truth or falsity of the evidence 
was dead and the law put on the plaintiffs the burden 
of investigating aceidents to its employees ( 42-1-92) and 
they made such an investigation, and made the report to 
the Commission, as is shown in page 1 of the record, and 
admitted that the accident on which the proceedings were 
had under Mr. Hansen's application for compensation 
was granted and paid. If this testimony had then been 
offered, Mr. Hansen was alive to have met what is said 
about an accident on March 20, 1938, by this witness 
and probably explained what this witness terms ''a 
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terrible jolt" and why he saw fit then to say anything 
about any injuries he was suffering from, and from what 
a,ccident they arose. 
This testimony does not show, in any way, that 
Mr. Hansen had not been injured on March 17, 1938, 
just as the proof offered showed, and also admitted by 
the plaintiffs' attorney in this hearing as is above set 
forth. The Commission had all of this and also the 
testimony of the doctors who were fully informed as to 
what the condition of Mr. Hansen then was and there-
sults from that testimony. The record clearly shows 
that Mr. Hansen was at all times trying to do the work 
to which he was assigned and from which he was earning 
$240.00 per month with which to support his dependents, 
and consequently even if he was suffering from that 
injury of March 17, 1938, he tried to carry on, and that 
he was not a man to talk about his sufferings. On page 
19 of the testimony taken at Ogden his wife, in answer 
to a question as to what she knew of his condition between 
November and when he came back in March from Cali-
fornia, said: ''He never mentioned anything to me.'' 
Section 42-1-79, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933, 
reads : ''The findings and conclusion of the Commission 
of questions of fact shall be conclusive and final and 
shall not be subject to review, etc.'' 
If the contention of the plaintiffs, that the Com-
mission had to permit the withdrawal of their stipula-
tions, be accepted by this Court as the law, then this 
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Court should return the whole matter to the Industrial 
Commission for an entire rehearing. Unless such an 
order should be made under the circumstances presented 
here, the respondent would be placed at a disadvantage 
never contemplated by the legislature, because the 
respondent, in the first place, was without information 
as to the effect of a withdrawal of the testimony, and 
secondly, no real reason was given or proved to justify 
the withdrawal. As a matter of fact, the withdrawal 
of the stipulation would not, in any sense, disprove that 
an accident occurred on the 17th of March, 1938, nor 
would it have any effect in disproving that the deceased 
had been compensation without objection by the plaintiffs 
up to June 1, 1938. If there is any disposition on the 
part of the Court to consider that insufficient evidence 
was before the Commission to justify its award to de-
fendant Olga Lassen Hansen, then in that event the 
only logical conclusion must be that the matter should be 
referred to the Industrial Commission for the taking of 
additional testimony. 
We submit that the Industrial Commission was 
justified in making the award that there was ample proof 
by admission of the appellants' counsel and by its offi-
cers in the report of the accident, that such an accident 
had occurred and that it did occur in the course of 
employment of the deceased even if there were nothing 
else in the record, and that as a result the action of the 
Industrial Commission should be approved. However, 
if there shall be any question with reference thereto, 
then it is respectfully submitted that the matter should 
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be referred to the Industrial Commission for the taking 
of further testimony. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DAN B. SHIELDS 
GEO.G.ARMSTRONG 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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